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•

STATE OF MAINE
' KENNEBEC, SS.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff,

v.
CLIFFORD SHATTUCK,
d/b/a LIGHTHOUSE MOTEL,
Defendant

CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-96-421
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

STATE’S MOTION TO RECOVER
CIVIL PENALTIES AND TO MODIFY
INJUNCTION PROHIBITING VIOLATIONS
OF THE MAINE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
ACT AND INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

INTRODUCTION

NOW COMES the State of Maine and requests this Honorable Court find the defendant
Clifford Shattuck, d/b/a Lighthouse Motel (“Shattuck”) has violated the injunction issued
September 24, 1996, prohibiting him violating the Unfair Trade Practices Act ( hereinafter
“UTPA injunction”) A Copy of the injunction is attached hereto. The State is also requesting
this Court modify the injunction to prohibit Shattuck from operating the Lighthouse motel or
having any contact with persons lodging or seeking lodging at the motel. Finally, the State is
requesting that the Court assess a civil penalty of $10,000 per violation for two violations of the
UTPA injunction pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
In support of this Motion the State of Maine alleges the following:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August of 1994, the State filed a complaint in this Court alleging that the defendant
Clifford Shattuck had violated the Maine Civil Right Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4681, by assaulting,
threatening, intimidating, coercing or harassing people because of race, religion, color, national

or ethnic origin or sexual orientation. The complaint was ultimately resolved by Consent Decree
and Order. As part of that Consent Decree and Order of August, 1994, Shattuck was enjoined
from, inter alia, assaulting, threatening, intimidating coercing or harassing any person because
of that person’s race, religion, color, national or ethnic origin or sexual orientation.
The next occassion in which the State intervened was in September of 1996 when the
State filed a civil Complaint against Shattuck alleging violations of the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. §§
206-214. In that complaint the State alleged that the defendant engaged in abusive, rude,
irrational, physically threatening, physically assaultive and damaging conduct to persons seeking
lodging at his motel. The State further alleged that defendant’s conduct violated the UTPA. In
order to resolve the matter the State and Shattuck entered into a second Consent Decree and
Order. As part of that Consent Decree the Court Ordered that the defendant Shattuck, his agents,
servants, employees, attorneys or anyone acting under his control, or any person in active concert
or participation with him is permanently enjoined pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-214 from:
A.

Engaging in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening, physically assaultive

and damaging conduct to persons seeking lodging at his motel.
B.

Violating the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§

206-214.
This Consent Decree and Order was signed by the parties on September 4, 1996 and
endorsed by the Court on September 24, 1996. It is the State’s position that the defendant’s
conduct violates this injunction as set forth below.

FACTS
On May 10, 1998, Mr. Hartigan, a resident of Starks, Maine and Ms. St. Pierre, a
resident of Albion, Maine were taking a Sunday ride on the coast of Maine. They were traveling
on Route One and looking for a place they might rent to take a week’s vacation this summer.
They noticed the cabins at the Lincolnville Lighthouse Motel. The vacancy sign was lit so they
pulled in the driveway to take a look. While they pulled into the driveway, Shattuck in a rage
came running out of a building towards them. He was red faced, waving his arms, screaming and
yelling, “back your car up, back your car up, Can’t you see the sign this is private”. He told them
they had to back out onto Route 1 and that they could not turn around and drive out. Shattuck
was so close to their vehicle that he was touching it with his body. He stood in front of their car
blocking the way so that they could not leave for about 4 or 5 minutes. Mrs. Shattuck also stood
in front of their car. During this time Mr. Shattuck continued screaming and appeared very
threatening. Ms. St. Pierre and Mr. Hartigan were frightened.

Mr. Hartigan stepped out of the

vehicle, cursed and told the Shattucks to let them leave or call the police. Mr. Hartigan got back
in the car and finally Mr. and Mrs Shattuck moved. Mr. Hartigan and Ms. St. Pierre drove away.
They reported the incident to the Waldo County Sheriffs Department.
On May 26, 1998, Ms. Wong, an American citizen of Chinese ancestry and a resident
of Massachusetts and her friend, a young woman from Ireland, were looking for a place to
stay. They drove into the driveway of the Lighthouse Motel and parked in front of the office.
They asked about room prices and they asked to see a room.

Mr. Shattuck acted as if this was

an unreasonable request. When Ms. Wong asked why he did not preshow rooms, Shattuck
replied “Why should I show my rooms?! I can’t show you the rooms before you pay for them,
what if you get in there and won’t get out? This is America and you get what you pay for.”

While saying this Shattuck’s voice was rising, and he no longer made eye contact. He became
very menacing and the women decided to get away as quickly as possible. The young women
were very scared and worried that Shattuck would physically harm them. As they left the office,
he immediately came out after them even more angry that they were leaving. Shattuck then
stood blocking them from being able to turn the car around. He yelled “You can’t turn around
here! Don’t you dare turn around here!” Their car was parked in the driveway and to the left
were two parking spaces where a person would normally turn around. Ms. Wong was very scared
that he was in their way and would not let them turn around. Shattuck continued to scream at her
but she was so shocked that she did not hear what he was saying. Finally, she asked “Sir, how am
I supposed to turn around?” He told them to “Back down the driveway” Frightened, they
followed his orders and backed down the length of the driveway onto Route 1. The women
went to another motel in Camden. From there they reported the incident to the Waldo County
Sheriffs Office.
ARGUMENT
Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 “any person who violates the terms of an injunction issued
under this section shall forfeit and pay to the State, to be applied in the carrying out of this
chapter, a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. For the purposes of this
section, the Court issuing such an injunction shall retain jurisdiction, and the cause shall be
continued, and in such cases the Attorney General acting in the name of the State may petition
for recovery of such civil penalty.” In this case the Court issued an injunction pursuant to the
UTPA enjoining the defendant from engaging in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening,
physically assaultive and damaging conduct to persons seeking lodging at his motel. On May 10,
1998 Mr. Shattuck’s motel was open and a vacancy sign was lit. Mr. Hartigan and Ms. St. Pierre

approached the motel in search of lodging. Mr. Shattuck’s behavior in screaming at them in a
rage and in standing in front of their car blocking them from leaving constitutes a violation of
the UTPA injunction.
On May 26, 1998, Ms. Wong and her friend entered the office of the Lighthouse Motel
in search a room for the night. When they asked to see a room before they agreed to stay, Mr.
Shattuck became enraged and menacing. Shattuck’s behavior in screaming at them, following
them when they left the office, blocking them from driving out the driveway and forcing them to
back down the driveway onto Route 1 also violates the UTPA injunction which prohibits
Shattuck from engaging in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening, physically assaultive
and damaging conduct to persons seeking lodging at his motel.
For these reasons the State is requesting that the Court find Shattuck has committed two
violations of the UTPA injunction and pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 impose a civil penalty of
up to $10,000 against defendant Shattuck for each violation of the injunction and award the
Attorney General the costs of bringing this motion.
Finally, the State is seeking to amend the UTPA injunction to provide that Mr. Shattuck
be prohibited from operating the Lighthuse Motel or having any contact with persons lodging or
seeking lodging at the Lighthouse Motel. There have already been two consent orders enjoining
Shattuck from threatening and verbally abusing people who happen upon his motel. He paid
fines when both of these orders were issued yet he continues to verbally assault and threaten
persons seeking rooms at the motel. For these reasons the State also requests that Shattuck be
enjoined from operating the Lighthouse Motel or having any contact with persons lodging or
seeking lodging at the Lighthouse Motel.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREW KETTERER

Dated: June 11, 1998
Me.Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
Public Protection Division
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Attorneys for State of Maine
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Reporter of Decisic

Panel:WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and CALKINS, JJ.

STATE OF MAINE
v.
CLIFFORD SHATTUCK

SAUFLEY, J.
[3[1] Clifford Shattuck, doing business as The Lighthouse Motel and
Cottage Court, appeals two orders entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec
County, Marden, J.) denying Shattuck's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a
1996 consent decree, finding Shattuck in contempt of the same consent
decree, and granting the State further injunctive relief. Finding no error,
we affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND

[12] Clifford Shattuck has owned and operated The Lighthouse Motel
and Cottage Court on U.S. Route 1 in Lincolnville since 1982. This seasonal
business includes nine motel rooms, thirteen freestanding cottages, a coffee
shop, an office, and the Shattuck summer residence.
Shattuck runs the
motel from March through Columbus Day Weekend every year with his wife
and two part-time employees.
[13] Between 1993 and 1998, The Lighthouse Motel was responsible
for approximately one-third of all public accommodation complaints filed
with the Camden-Rockport-Lincolnville Chamber of Commerce. Unlike
other accommodation-related complaints, which relate primarily to
cleanliness, the complaints lodged against The Lighthouse Motel were
directed at Shattuck's behavior toward his customers.
In 1994, the State
filed a complaint in the Waldo County Superior Court alleging that Shattuck
had violated the Maine Civil Rights Act "by assaulting, threatening,
intimidating, coercing or harassing people who sought lodging at his motel
because of race, religion, color, national or ethnic origin or sexual
orientation." Shattuck, through counsel, resolved the matter by entering
into a consent decree and order enjoining him from "assaulting,
threatening, intimidating, coercing or harassing, or attempting to assault,
threaten, intimidate, coerce or harass, any person . . . because of that
person's race, religion, color, national or ethnic origin or sexual
orientation."
Shattuck was assessed and paid a civil penalty of $3000.
[314] The 1994 consent decree was only partially effective. Although
he continued to treat his customers in an assaulting, threatening,
intimidating, coercing, and harassing manner, Shattuck apparently no
longer targeted a particular group of people. Because of continued
complaints, the State again filed another complaint against Shattuck in
1996, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. Shattuck and his
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wife, this time unrepresented by counsel, met with an assistant attorney
general and entered into a new consent decree on September 4, 1996. The
decree enjoined Shattuck from "engaging in abusive, rude, irrational,
physically assaultive and damaging conduct to persons seeking lodging at his
motel; and . . . violating the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act."
The consent decree was submitted to the Superior Court, where it was
accepted by the court (Alexander, J.) and entered as a judgment of the
court.
Shattuck also paid the State $3500 for the cost of the suit and the
State's investigation.
[55] Once again, the new consent decree failed to induce the desired
result. Specifically, on the State's motion for contempt, the Superior Court
heard evidence related to three incidents during the 1998 season. The first
incident occurred over Memorial Day weekend when two women asked if
they could see a room before committing to rent it. Shattuck announced in
"an argumentative and coercive manner" that he did not allow people to see
rooms before paying for them. The women decided to look for lodging
elsewhere, and returned to their vehicle. The Superior Court recounted the
events as follows:
Upon entering their automobile, the women discovered the
defendant standing directly in front of the car so that it was
impossible for them to turn the car around without injuring the
defendant.
In spite of ample turnaround space, the defendant
ordered the women not to turn around but to back down the
driveway. The manner in which the defendant conducted
himself caused the women to be frightened and they backed
their vehicle down the driveway and out onto Route 1 in order to
proceed.
[56] The Superior Court found that a second incident occurred in July
1998 when a couple asked to see a room before deciding whether to stay at
the motel. After Shattuck made it clear that he would not allow them to see
a room in advance, the husband turned to his wife and said, "Do you want to
gamble?" Shattuck immediately became very angry, throwing his arms in
the air and screaming, "I don't like your attitude, take your money
somewhere else, get out of here." The couple left hurriedly, feeling very
threatened as Shattuck continued to yell at them through the screen door.
[57] Finally, the court found that a third incident occurred, which
took place on Mother's Day 1998. A man testified that after seeing a vacancy
sign, he and a female companion pulled onto the premises to investigate.
They were met by Shattuck who was "acting like a 'raging lunatic.'"
Shattuck "blocked [their] car leaning over the front hood and preventing
them from backing out or leaving the premises." The woman began to cry
and the man got out of the car advising Shattuck to either get out of his way
or call the police.
Shattuck remained, screaming and threatening the
couple, in front of the car for approximately ten minutes, before eventually
moving and allowing them to leave. The woman felt terrorized by the
experience.
[58] When the State filed its motion pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209
(1989 & Supp. 1999) requesting that the court assess civil penalties for
each violation of the 1996 consent decree, it also moved to amend the 1996
decree to enjoin Shattuck from having contact with motel patrons.
Shattuck
then moved, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b), for relief from the 1996 decree.
After hearing testimony on all three motions, the Superior Court denied
Shattuck's Rule 60(b) motion for relief, sanctioned Shattuck for violating the
1996 consent decree, and modified the decree to enjoin Shattuck from
having contact with motel patrons. This appeal followed.
II.

DISCUSSION

[59] Shattuck contends that the Superior Court (1) abused its
discretion in denying his motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b); (2) erred
in concluding that his behavior violated the UTPA; (3) lacked the authority
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to modify the injunctive order; and (4) abused its discretion in assessing
sanctions. We discuss each claim in turn.
A.

Rule 60(b)

[510] Shattuck filed a motion for relief from the 1996 consent decree
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (4).{1} We review the Superior Court's denial of
a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
See Department of Human
Servs. v. Sabattus, 683 A.2d 170, 171 (Me. 1996). We will vacate such a
judgment only when the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion works a plain and
unmistakable injustice against the party.
See Harris v. PT Petro Corp., 650
A. 2d 1346, 1348 (Me. 1994).
[511] Shattuck argues that relief from the 1996 decree was required
because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him at the time the
consent decree was entered. Specifically, Shattuck contends that the court
could not have obtained personal jurisdiction over him because he did not
knowingly and voluntarily consent to personal jurisdiction when he signed
the 1996 decree.
In support of this argument, he asserts that he (1) never
"appeared" in the action; (2) never received notice that a court action had
been started; and (3) did not realize that a court action would result from
his signing the decree.
[512] These arguments lack merit. Shattuck does not dispute that he
received a copy of the complaint, met with agents for the State to negotiate
a settlement, and signed the consent decree containing express
acknowledgment that the "court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and
Defendant Shattuck . . . and the subject matter of this action." Shattuck also
understood that the decree would be filed with the court.
Indeed, the
record reflects that the State agreed to Shattuck's request to delay the filing
of the consent decree with the court until after a social event at the hotel
had been completed. The fact that Shattuck was not represented during the
initial proceeding does not change the analysis. See Richards v. Bruce, 1997
ME 61, 5 8, 691 A.2d 1223, 1225. There is ample evidence in the record
supporting the Superior Court's conclusion that the court had personal
jurisdiction over Shattuck at the time the consent decree was filed.
B.

UTPA Violations

[513] Shattuck next contends that the Superior Court erred in
determining that his behavior violated the UTPA. The UTPA makes unlawful
"'[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.'" Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Union St. Mkt.,
1998 ME 37, 5 7, 706 A.2d 595, 597 (quoting 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (1989)).
"Neither term as used in Maine's UTPA can be precisely defined, and their
applicability should be determined on a case by case basis." Guiggey v.
Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 1992). We review the Superior
Court's conclusions for clear error.
See Sebago Lake Camps, Inc. v.
Simpson, 434 A.2d 519, 521 (Me. 1981).
[514] The court concluded that under "most circumstances"
Shattuck's policy not to "pre-show" rooms standing alone would not be
unfair, but concluded that in the current context it was unfair because
Shattuck entices customers onto his property and "creates a situation in
which he can selectively abuse the traveling public." We agree. Shattuck's
response to customers' questions regarding the policy was demonstrated to
have been not merely rude but frightening and threatening to potential
customers.
[515] Similarly, Shattuck's policy of allowing only "patrons" to turn
around in the motel driveway is both abusive and unfair in its enforcement.
As the court concluded, backing out onto Route 1 can be an unpleasant and
dangerous experience.
Shattuck's behavior in forcing frightened and tearful
prospective customers to back out of his property onto a busy thoroughfare,
rather than turn around and drive out into the traffic, was also demonstrated
to have been sufficiently outrageous and dangerous that the court did not err
in finding the conduct to have violated the UTPA.{2}
[516] We agree with Shattuck that the UTPA does not control simple
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rude or boorish behavior on the part of merchants.{3} However, when the
conduct of a merchant repeatedly frightens, terrorizes, or physically
endangers the public, and when that conduct is sufficiently outrageous that
it may reasonably be understood to have such an effect, that conduct is
"unfair" within the meaning of the UTPA. The record reflects sufficient
facts to support the Superior Court's conclusion that Shattuck's behavior
rose to the level of an unfair trade practice.
C.

Court's Authority

[517]
Shattuck argues that the consent decree was an agreement
between himself and the State, and maintains that the Superior Court lacked
the authority to modify the decree, relying on Berry v. Somerset Railway, 89
Me. 552, 554, 36 A. 904, 905 (1897).
Shattuck's reliance on Berry,
however, is misplaced. Berry involved an agreement that was "not an entry
ordered by the court." Id. In contrast, once the court signed the consent
decree between Shattuck and the State, it became a judgment of the court.
Contrary to Shattuck's contention, the court does not ordinarily treat a
judgment entered upon agreement of the parties differently than a judgment
entered after hearing or other adversarial process. As we have made clear,
"consent to the entry of a decree does not serve to deprive the court of the
power to modify the decree." Clifford v. Klein, 463 A.2d 709, 713-14 (Me.
1983) (citing System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 646-47 (1961)).
[518] We recognize that, because a consent decree is the product of
negotiations by parties who elect to waive their rights to litigate and,
instead, reach a compromise in which the parties each give up something
they might have won through litigation, see United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971), such a decree is in some respects contractual
in nature, see Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378
(1992). Nonetheless, "it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect
will be reflected in, and enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to
the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees." Rufo, 502
U.S. at 378. Thus, when the court is otherwise authorized to amend a
judgment, it may do so whether the judgment was entered through litigation
or consent.
See Clifford, 463 A.2d at 709; Rufo, 502 U.S. at 378-79.
[519] A court is authorized to amend an injunction when the
circumstances giving rise to the injunction have changed since the entry of
the injunction.
See Clifford, 463 A.2d at 714. Although modification of a
consent decree is an available remedy, in the absence of a new agreement of
the parties, it is not a remedy to be casually undertaken.
See Walker v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 826 (5th Cir.
1990) . A party who originally waived his right to litigate a request for an
injunction is entitled to no less due process on a motion to modify the
agreed upon injunction than a party who litigated the original request.{4} A
court may not make a modification without an adjudication or admission
either that the defendant violated the existing consent decree or that other
circumstances have arisen since the entry of the decree warranting a
modification of the injunctive relief.
See Clifford, 463 A.2d at 714; Rufo,
502 U.S. at 380.(5} Moreover, the court must be convinced that modification
is essential to remedy the situation.
See Clifford, 463 A.2d at 714.
[520] Accordingly, before imposing additional responsibilities on a
party subject to an order of injunction, the court must assure that the
defendant has received notice that the court may impose obligations
different from, or in addition to, those contained in the judgment and that
the parties have an opportunity to present relevant evidence on the need for
the additional obligations and the proper character of those obligations.
Additionally, the court should make specific findings of fact that support a
determination that modification is warranted.
See Johnson v. Robinson, 987
F.2d 1043, 1050 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 894
F.2d 430, 437 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1990).{6}
[521]
In the present case, the record reflects (1) that Shattuck had
notice of the fact that the trial court was considering imposing the
additional requirement that he refrain from contact with customers; (2) that
Shattuck was provided an opportunity to present evidence refuting the
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State's position that such a modification was necessary; and (3) that the trial
court's decision and order contained specific facts sufficient to support its
decision to impose such a drastic measure. At hearing, the State introduced
evidence of facts occurring since the entry of the decree. From that
evidence, the court found that the circumstances had changed, that
Shattuck had not complied with the original decree, and that further
injunctive relief was warranted by the facts. Accordingly, the court acted
within its authority when it amended the injunctive relief to preclude
Shattuck's contact with the traveling public.
D.

Sanctions and Modification

[522] Finally, Shattuck argues that the Superior Court erred in
assessing civil penalties and modifying the injunctive relief. The Court
assessed civil penalties of $5000 for each of the three reported incidents
and modified the injunctive relief to prevent Shattuck from having contact
with motel patrons.
[523] We review the sanctions and the modification for abuse of
discretion.
See State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 1995) ,Department of Envtl. Protection v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 767-68 (Me.1989).
"Because this injunction is remedial in nature, the trial court has
broad discretion to 'fashion an appropriate remedy to do complete justice.'
-Moreover, '[t]he court's equitable powers assume an especially broad and
flexible character when . . . the public interest is involved.'" DeCoster, 653
A.2d at 895 (quoting State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362,
366-67 (Me. 1987)).
Significant sanctions may be appropriate to compel
compliance with court orders and to protect the public.
See Town of Bar
Harbor v. Evans, 499 A.2d 157, 158 (Me. 1985).
[524] Here, the record is replete with evidence supporting the need
for penalties and a modification of the injunctive relief. The court was faced
with an individual who repeatedly threatened and abused the public, after
being fined for doing so in 1994 and again in 1996. Shattuck negotiated and
signed two consent decrees, agreeing to refrain from these abusive practices
and yet continued to abuse the public and threaten unsuspecting patrons.
Based on his continuing disregard for the court's orders, the Superior Court
acted well within its broad discretion to assess civil penalties and to modify
the injunctive relief. Because the court maintains the authority to amend
the injunction after proper notice and an opportunity to be heard, Shattuck
may seek relief from the injunction upon a showing that he will not continue
to act in a manner that violates the Act.
The entry i s :
Judgment affirmed.
_____
Attorneys for plaintiff:
Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General
Linda Conti, Asst. Attorney General (orally)
Kathleen Roberts, Asst. Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Attorney for defendant:
Frederick M. Newcomb III, Esq.,
Newcomb & Reynolds, P.A.
P O Box 1115
Rockland, ME 04841-1115

(orally)

FOOTNOTES******************************** {1} . Because Shattuck’s motion was filed
over two years after the order, we need not discuss his allegations made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1).
See M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (requiring that the "motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken"). {2} . See Levesque v. Williamsburg Assocs., No. CV93 052 62 35 S, 1995 WL 91418
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(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17,1995) (holding "prolonged course of dangerous conduct" actionable under
Unfair Trade Practices Act). {3} .On this issue, we note that the 1996 injunctive order, drafted by the
Attorney General’s office to reflect the parties’ agreement, was clearly overbroad, particularly in its
attempt to prohibit merely rude or irrational behavior. Because the court did not rely on that part of
the order in reaching its findings here, we need not address this deficit. {4} . Indeed, some courts
have accorded more protection to the settling defendant, in recognition of the institutional desire to
encourage settlements. See Walker v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 912 F.2d 819, 825
26 (5th Cir. 1990). {5} . See also Fox v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 680 F.2d 315,
323 (3rd Cir. 1982). {6} .An exception may be made when the elements necessary for the entry of a
temporary restraining order are met. See M.R. Civ. P. 65(a) ("A temporary restraining order may be
granted without written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party’s attorney...."). The
opportunity for notice and hearing must, obviously, follow the entry of any such order.
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.
STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
CLIFFORD SHATTUCK, d / b / a /
as the Lighthouse Motel and
Cottage C ourt,
Lincolnville Beach, Maine

CONSENT DECREE
)
)
)
)

D efendant

Plaintiff, State of Maine, having filed its Complaint on September 23, 1996
reflecting allegations of violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act and Plaintiff and
Defendant having consented to the entry of this Consent Decree w ithout trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and w ithout this Decree constituting
any adm ission by Defendant w ith respect to such issues, it is hereby ORDERED and
DECREED as follows:
I. JURISDICTION
This C ourt has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Defendant Shattuck, d / b / a
Lighthouse M otel and Cottage Court and the subject m atter of this action. The
Com plaint st

under 5 M.R.S.A. §206-214 ( 1989 and Pamph.

1995).

.ployees, attorneys or anyone
oncert or participation w ith him,

2
A.

Engaging in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening,

physically assaultive and damaging conduct to persons seeking lodging at his
m otel.
B.

Violating the provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices Act,

5 M.R.S.A. §206-214.
3.

The Defendant shall to provide to the D epartm ent of the Attorney

General by the 15th of every m onth the names and addresses of guests of the
Lighthouse M otel and Cottage Court for the months of May, 1997 to October, 1997.
Thereafter, the D efendant shall provide the names and addresses of guests upon the
request of the D epartm ent of the Attorney General.
4.

The Defendant shall pay to the Department of the A ttorney General the

costs of the suit and investigation, including attorneys' fees in the am ount of $3,500.

Clark of Courts

Kathleen A. Roberts
Assistant A ttorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8542
Attorney for State of Maine
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-96-421

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER
CLIFFORD SHATTUCK,
d / b / a LIGHTHOUSE MOTEL
and COTTAGE COURT,
D efendant
This m atter is before the court on the State's m otion to recover dvil penalties
and to m odify injunction prohibiting violations of the M aine U nfair Trade Practices
Act. O n Septem ber 24, 1996, this court approved and adopted by order a Consent
Decree entered into by the parties in this action from a com plaint filed by the
plaintiff alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act by the defendant. This
C onsent D ecree, executed Septem ber 4, 1996, p ro v id e d th a t defendant was
p erm an en tly enjoined from engaging in abusive, ru d e, irratio n al, physically
threatening, physically assaultive and dam aging conduct to persons seeking lodging
at his m otel and further violating the provisions of the U nfair Trade Practices Act,
in accordance w ith 5 M.R.S.A. § 206-214. Defendant further agreed and was ordered
to provide inform ation to the D epartm ent of the A ttorney G eneral and to pay the
cost of suit an d investigation including attorney's fees of the D epartm ent of the
A ttorney G eneral in the am ount of $3,500.

O n June 15, 1998, the State filed its

motion alleging a previous Consent Decree and O rder of A ugust of 1994 in which

d efe n d an t w as enjoined from, inter alia, assaulting, th reaten in g , intim idating,
coercing or harassing any person because of that p erso n 's race, religion, color,
national or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation all as provided u nder the Maine
Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 4681. By its present pending m otion, the plaintiff is
asking the court to find from facts presented at testim onial hearing that defendant
has com m itted violations of the UTPA injunction and requests a civil penalty in
accordance w ith 5 M.R.S.A. § 209. Further, the plaintiff seeks to am end the UTPA
injunction to incorporate additional provisions th at the d efen d an t be prohibited
from certain operations of the Lighthouse M otel or from having contact w ith
persons lodging or seeking lodging at the Lighthouse Motel.
O n the M emorial Day weekend, tw o young w om en, one of Asian and the
o th er of Irish extraction, drove into the yard of the L ighthouse Motel having
previously observed a sign advertising room s for $25 a night. They parked their car
a n d w alked into the reception area an d w ere m et by the defendant, Clifford
Shattuck. After requesting information w ith respect to rates, the ladies asked Mr.
S hattuck if they could see a room.

The defendant firm ly announced in an

arg u m en tativ e an d coercive m anner that he did n o t show his room s, that he
m aintained a "no pre-show policy" and he advised the wom en, "You pay first, if
th ere's a problem w e'll settle the issue."

U nder the circum stances, the women

decided they w ere not interested and w alked out of the reception building followed
closely by the defendant. Upon entering their autom obile, the wom en discovered
the defendant standing directly in front of the car so that it was impossible for them
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to turn the car around w ithout injuring the defendant.

In spite of am ple tu rn 

around space, the defendant ordered the wom en not to turn around b u t to back
dow n the drivew ay. The manner in which the defendant conducted himself caused
the w om en to be frightened and they backed their vehicle dow n the drivew ay and
out onto Route 1 in order to proceed. The wom en reported the m atter to the Waldo
County S heriffs Office.
They are no traffic signs in the drivew ay nor is they any sign indicating a
policy of refusal to show a room. In addition, there are no photographs of the
rooms available in the reception area. In light of the history of this m atter between
the State of M aine and the defendant, of significance is Mr. Shattuck's response
w hen the ladies suggested that m ost m otels allow a view ing of the room s before
registration saying, "You usually get to see w hat you pay for." To this Mr. Shattuck
said, "This is America, you get what you pay for."
D uring the week of July 20th, a w om an from V erm ont entered the premises
of the Lighthouse Motel with her husband after seeing the sign $25 per couple for
cabins. An inquiry was made if room s w ere available and a request to look at a
cabin. D efendant m ade it clear that prospective patrons do not get to look at a cabin
until it is p aid for using the words, "We d o n 't check you out, you d o n 't check us
out." At this point, the husband said to his wife, "Do you w ant to gamble?" At this,
the defendant becam e very angry, throw ing his arms in the air and screaming, "I
d o n 't like your attitude, take your m oney som ew here else, get out of here." The
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party feeling very threatened, immediately left the premises. The defendant did not
follow them but they could hear him hollering at them through the screen door.
O n M other's Day, a gentleman and his female friend w ent to the premises of
the Lighthouse Motel observing a vacancy sign on in the afternoon. The parties
w ished to determ ine w hether the posted rate w as applicable.

Pulling into the

drivew ay, they started to back into the parking area an d w ere im m ediately
threatened by the defendant in a m anner w hich they described as acting like a
"raging lunatic," possibly reacting to the gentlem an's leather jacket, long hair and
sunglasses. The defendant blocked the gentlem an and ladies' car leaning over the
front hood and prevented them from backing out or leaving the prem ises.

The

lady, a person who suffers from post-traum atic stress disorder, was crying and the
gentlem an got out of the car advising the defendant to either get o u t of the way or
call the police. The witnesses indicated they w ere held or detained by the defendant
w hile he stood in front of the car for approxim ately 10 m inutes. A t the time the
defen d ant w as threatening them, he appeared red-faced, scream ing and yelling.
Defendant ordered them to back up to Route 1 and accused the persons of using the
drivew ay as a turn-around.

At the tim e defendant w as detaining the party, the

defendant's wife was yelling at the female companion while standing in front of the
car. W hen the defendant was advised by the gentlem an that his detention was not
law ful as he was holding them against their will, the defendant responded that it
w as his property and he could do it. While the gentlem an was clearly angered by
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the conduct, the female member of the party was extrem ely frightened. The couple
reported the incident to the Sheriff's Office.
The wife of the defendant testified and provided a detailed description of the
m o tel room s a n d

cottages w hich m ake u p

th e

d e fe n d a n t's com m ercial

establishm ent. She explained the "no-show " policy w hich they enforce except for
those persons who are handicapped. She advised that she will show the parties to a
room after she has received the money and they have registered explaining that she
p u ts the m oney and the charge slip in her pocket until the parties move in. She
advised that this policy was explained several tim es a day during the season. She
further testified that the driveway has a sign saying "patrons turning only" and that
the policy is to protect their property from dam age that has been done in the past by
cars turning around. She advised that a patron was a person who had registered and
w as a guest of the motel/cottages.
She described her version of the incidents in question to the extent that she
w as present and accused the person w ith leather jacket and long hair of engaging in
obscene conduct. She denied that the female com panion was crying and quoted her
as saying, "Please get out of our way and we'U never come here again." She denied
th at her husband was screaming when a reference w as m ade between husband and
wife as to w hether they wanted to take a gam ble testifying that her husband said,
"Maybe we d o n 't w ant to take a gamble on you." Basically Mrs. Shattuck indicated
that the policy of refusing to show rooms was created because she and her husband
were very busy and usually pressed for time and some people "are just looking."
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The defendant testified that he has run this establishm ent for 17 years from
May to October. They have two employees and generally have 3,000 to 3,500 guests
per year.

H e described the rules of the establishm ent including prohibition on

sm oking in the coffee shop, speed limits in the drivew ay, specified parking areas,
"patron turning only," and the "no pre-show " policy which he asserts has been in
existence for 14 years.
W ith respect to the incident of the tw o young ladies, he testified that they
accused him of having something to hide and that he responded, "At our corner of
America, we d o n 't show rooms." He further testified that it was apparent they were
not going to stay bu t w anted to see a room. H e adm itted that he raised his voice and
explained that he advised them to turn at the entrance to the drivew ay and not back
out on Route 1.
W ith respect to the individual w ith the leather jacket and long hair, Mr.
Shattuck described the incident as follows:
Q:

By defendant in a loud voice "W hat are you doing?"

A:

"W e're turning around."

Q:

"Did you see that sign?"

A:

"W e're just going out."

D efendant m oved to the front of the car saying "w e d o n 't perm it
turning."
A:

"W hat do you w ant me to do?"

Defendant: "Back up the way you came."
A:

"Fuck you" followed by repeated use of the obscenity.
6

Defendant said the conversation ended w hen he backed off and directed the
individual to "just get out of here." H e denies he was scream ing but he admits that
he was speaking loud enough to be heard over the sound of the car. He also testified
the incident only took three or four m inutes.
W ith respect to the m arried couple, the defendant testified as to a pleasant
three or four m inute conversation about V erm ont, the residence of the couple.
After the couple requested to see a cottage w hich was denied by the defendant, he
describes the conversation as follows:
M arried couple:
"Are they pretty nice?"
Defendant:
"Yeah, I think so."
Husband:
"Shall we take a gamble?"
The defendant advised that he took offense at the comm ent and everything
changed. The defendant told the couple, "I d o n 't think we w ould happy having you
here w ith us, take your business elsewhere." D efendant denied that he screamed,
w aved his arms or m oved around from behind the counter. He adm itted going to
the screen door bu t denied making any statem ents through the screen door.
W ith respect to the Consent Decree, the defendant admits to the procedures
w ith respect to his entering into such an agreem ent but emphatically asserts that he

7

d id not know a court action w ould be filed.

H e w as m ore concerned about the

appearance in the new spaper of the matter.
Defendant adm its to signing the 1994 C onsent Decree. Finally, the defendant
admits that at no time has he ever posted any notice of the "no pre-show policy."
Both defendant and his wife testified as to the custom er satisfaction literature
which they have received in which they believe they operate an establishm ent well
serving the traveling public. In rebuttal, the State presented the Executive Director
of the C am den-R ockport C ham ber of C om m erce w h o o u tlin ed a series of
complaints received by her office with respect to the operation of this establishm ent,
m ost particularly, the conduct of the defendant.
Two general issues are presented to the court.

First, has the defendant

violated the U nfair Trade Practices Act injunction im posed upon him as orders of
the court and, second, has he undertaken additional violations of the Act by unfairly
refusing to provide reasonable lodging to all persons coming to his establishment?
The court is satisfied that there is overw helm ing evidence that the defendant has
engaged in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening and dam aging conduct
to persons seeking lodging at his motel in direct violation of the Consent Decree of
Septem ber 24, 1996.

The court further finds overw helm ing evidence that after

enticing potential custom ers to his prem ises c au sin g them to drive into his
driveway a distance to his reception area, w ith no m ore w arning than a sign making
reference to "patrons," he reacts in an assaultive and threatening m anner to persons
whose conduct or appearance he finds objectionable.
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Any com m ent upon his

refusal to show a potential customer a room is m et w ith abuse. Persons w hom he
perceives u sin g the d rivew ay to tu rn a ro u n d are m et w ith sim ilar conduct.
D efendant does n o t explain how a p erso n seeking to becom e a "patron" can
reaso n ab ly be p u t on notice that u n til he o r she has reg istered w ith the
establishm ent, he or she is not a "patron" and thereby rendered the privilege of
turning their vehicle around. Otherwise, the court takes judicial notice that driving
o n e's autom obile in reverse out onto Route 1 in this area is an unpleasant and
dangerous chore.
Is it an unfair practice not to show a room to a potential custom er before
requiring deposit and registration? W hile probably not under m ost circumstances,
it w ould appear to be an unfair practice w here one advertises a room at the rate of
$25 p er n ig h t an d does not otherw ise announce the policy p rior to a person
violating a rule not to tu rn around in the defendant's driveway.

The defendant

creates a situation in w hich he can selectively abuse the traveling public w ithout
m aking any reasonable effort to accommodate those travelers in the enforcem ent of
his policies such as appropriate signs, photographs of the room s and cottages, and
reasonably civil conduct in dealing w ith the public.
The court has issued its injunction pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices Act
enjoining the d efen d an t from engaging in abusive, ru d e, irrational, physical
threatening, physically assaultive and dam aging conduct to persons seeking lodging
at his m otel.

On three occasions, the defendant has violated this injunction.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209:
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Any person w ho violates the term s of an injunction issued under this
section shall forfeit and pay to the State, to be applied in the carrying
out of this chapter, a civil penalty of not m ore than $10,000 for each
violation.
The State is asking the court to am end th e injunction to p ro h ib it the
defendant from operating the Lighthouse Motel or having any contact w ith persons
lodging or seeking lodging at the Lighthouse Motel. The defendant has ow ned and
operated this establishm ent for 17 years. H e acquired the property and operated with
his first wife in 1982 until she passed away in 1990. The defendant and his daughter
o perated the L ighthouse Motel and Cabins for three years.
p resen t wife have operated since 1993.

D efendant and his

The records of the local C ham ber of

Com m erce indicate there have been 18 com plaints of defendant's conduct as to
rudeness and abusive behavior in the last five years. That does not seem to suggest
a w idespread pervasive behavior on the p art of the defendant as to his guests and
potential guests b u t there clearly is a serious problem created by the defendant's
behavior and w ith which the State quite appropriately has a very serious interest.
O n tw o previous occasions, the defendant has been m ade aw are of this serious
conduct and has agreed to comply w ith orders of the court prohibiting such
behavior.

It w ould appear that he does not u n d e rstan d the seriousness of his

conduct, the degree to which certain persons are frightened by his behavior or a
public policy which prohibits such abuse of the traveling public. Accordingly, the
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court believes that further injunctive relief is necessary.1
The entry will be:
U pon m otion by the State to recover civil penalties against
d efen d an t Clifford Shattuck, the court finds th at Clifford Shattuck
v iolated the UTPA injunction issued on Septem ber 24, 1996, by
engaging in abusive, rude, irrational, physically threatening and
dam aging conduct to persons seeking lodging at the Lighthouse Motel
on three occasions; a civil penalty of $15,000 is assessed against
defendant Clifford Shattuck, d / b / a Lighthouse Motel for the violations
described herein; the O rder of Septem ber 24, 1996, is am ended to add
the following: "U ntil further order or relief from this court under its
continuing jurisdiction in this m atter, defendant Clifford Shattuck is
prohibited from having any contact with any person lodging or seeking
lodging at the Lighthouse Motel and Cottage Court, Lincolnville Beach,
M aine"; defendant Clifford Shattuck is further ORDERED to pay the
costs of the D epartm ent of the A ttorney G eneral in bringing this
m otion, including its attorney's fees.

Dated: A pril

, 1999

1 The State has moved to submit additional evidence in this matter based upon a postcard of a
hyena allegedly sent to the Executive Director of the Camden-Rockport-Lincolnviile Chamber of
Commerce by the defendant. While this may be an indication of continuing inappropriate behavior on
the part of the defendant, the court believes this is a matter between the Executive Director and the
defendant for which there is more appropriate relief available in the form of a petition for protection
from harassment.
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-96-421

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.

ORDER

CLIFFORD SHATTUCK,
d / b / a LIGHTHOUSE MOTEL
an d COTTAGE COURT,
Defendant

This m atter is before the court on defendant's m otion for relief from Consent
Decree in accordance w ith M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (4). The defendant asserts that
the Consent Decree of September 24, 1996, is void in th at the court did not have
p ersonal jurisdiction over the defendant at the tim e the order was entered and
defendant's consent was mistakenly given. This m otion w as filed on August 12, the
d a y before testim onial hearing on the p lain tiff's m o tio n for civil penalties.
Testim ony w ith regard to the m otion w as heard as p a rt of the hearing on the
p lain tiff's m otion.

D efendant adm its to m eeting w ith a representative of the

D epartm ent of the Attorney General "to clear the air" back in 1996. He believes he
settled the m atter for $3,500 and denies observing th e entire docum ent that he
signed. He believes he had cleared him self by paym ent of the $3,500 and was more
concerned about the appearance in the new spaper w ith respect to the matter. He
d en ied any know ledge that the Decree w ould be a p a rt of any court action.
Defendant further testified and adm itted that he signed papers in August of 1994 on

i an am ended com plaint out of the A ttorney General's Office resulting in a Consent
Decree on A ugust 26, 1994.

The defendant's m em ory of the details w ith respect to

the 1996 Decree are contained in an affidavit filed w ith the court in support of his
m o tio n .
The plaintiff responds that the m otion, having been brought under M.R. Civ.
P. 60B(1) and (4) w as subject to a one-year lim itation an d that the court is w ithout
jurisdiction to grant relief.
O ther than defendant's protestations, there is no evidence that this court
lacked jurisdiction or that defendant did not receive p ro p er notice w ith respect to
the m atters initiated against him. The defendant received a letter and copy of the
com plaint, he m et w ith an A ssistant A ttorney General and negotiated a Consent
Decree. By doing so, the defendant m ade himself subject to the court's jurisdiction
and w aived any deficiencies in the service.
Accordingly, the entry will be:
D efendant's motion for relief from Consent Decree is DENIED.

Dated: April

^

, 1999
Justice, Superior C ourt
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W ) 2 6 1999
)
co ur ts

v.
)
Clifford Shattuck, d.b.a.
The Lighthouse Motel &
Cottage Court,
Defendant

CiftJTTCE OF APPEAL TO THE LAW
COURT: Rule 73 M.R.Civ.P.

)
) '
)
)

Pursuant to Rule 73(b) M.R.Civ.P. notice is hereby given
that the above-named defendant, Clifford Shattuck, appeals to the
Law Court from the final judgment entered in this action on April
28, 1999.

May 25, 1998

Attorney for the Defendant
NEWCOMB AND REYNOLDS,
ATTORNEYS AT LAW,- P.A.
166 Main Street
P.0. Box 1115
Rockland, Maine 04841-1115
(207) 594-5178

